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Abstract
This article draws on research undertaken by the authors as part of the Administrative Data Research Centre in England
(ADRC-E). Between 2014 and 2017, we conducted four case studies on government administrative data for education,
transport, energy and health. The purpose of the research was to examine stakeholder perspectives about the sharing,
linking and re-use (secondary use) of government administrative data. In relation to the role and nature of consent given
by data subjects for re-use, our study revealed significant variations in data provider and researcher attitudes. Although
our study setting was England, we believe that the findings have wider resonance. Our analysis identified six factors which
might account for the variations around consent: the specificities of the legislative framework governing the collection
and processing of particular data; the type of data being collected and the relational context in which it is created; the
broader information governance framework in which the data resides; the creating organization’s approach to data
release; the relative levels of risk aversity within the creating organization; and public perceptions and social attitudes. In
conclusion, we consider whether consent is still the best mechanism available for data re-use, or whether a social
contract model of data sharing should be developed.
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Introduction
Obtaining the consent of the data subject is the primary
mechanism which underpins the fair and lawful process-
ing of personal data in a European setting. It acts as a
governance mechanism ‘to protect individual interests,
to promote personal autonomy, and to act as a founda-
tion for trust’ (Laurie and Postan, 2013: 372–373).
However, consent is not a simple concept and is not
easily deﬁned, obtained, or observed. In the age of Big
Data, there are questions over whether it is a suﬃcient
mechanism to protect privacy, and the extent to which it
can address a wider set of concerns around the ‘fairness,
justice, and due process’ of data use and re-use (Barocas
and Nissenbaum, 2014a). In an exploration of the limits
of consent, O’Neill (2003) suggests that the inherently
propositional nature of consent creates degrees of opa-
city around what is being consented to. Does consent
represent informed choice, particularly when possible
outcomes are complex or when the freedoms of the
individual may be compromised? O’Neill (2003) also
argues that the consent of individuals is not suﬃcient
when the resulting action has implications at a collective
as well as an individual level.
Research ‘in the public interest’ (which uses pseudo-
nymised or identiﬁable person-level data) may reduce
the obligation to obtain consent. In place of explicit
consent, researchers and data providers rely on legal
gateways, on privacy notices, and on oﬀering opt-outs
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to data subjects. Our research uncovered distinct diﬀer-
ences in the role and nature of consent for the research
use of government administrative data in England
across education, energy, transport, and health. Our
analysis identiﬁed six factors which might help to
explain the variations: (1) the speciﬁcities of the legis-
lative framework governing the collection and process-
ing of particular data; (2) the type of data being
collected and the relational context in which it is cre-
ated; (3) the broader information governance frame-
work in which the data resides; (4) the creating
organization’s approach to data release; (5) the relative
levels of risk aversity within the creating organization;
and (6) public perceptions and social attitudes.
Although our study setting was England, we believe
that the ﬁndings have wider resonance.
In this article, following a discussion of the qualita-
tive, inductive research methods used, we present a dis-
cussion about the data relating to consent from the four
case studies in turn (education, transport, energy, and
health), followed by a summary of the six factors which
inﬂuence the understanding of consent identiﬁed from
the research data. We explore whether a single
approach across government to consent for the second-
ary research use of personal data exists or can be devel-
oped or, perhaps preferably, whether a multi-faceted
model can be envisaged which would allow for both
individual and collective goods and would promote
public understanding and trust in government data
use. In conclusion, we consider whether consent is
still the best mechanism available for data re-use, or
whether an alternative social contract model of data
sharing should be considered. This research contributes
to public policy debates and suggests an approach to
the reconﬁguration of the social understandings around
consent for secondary data use.
In European law governing the processing of per-
sonal data, obtaining the consent of the data subject is
the primary procedural mechanism which underpins
the fair and lawful processing of personal data
(General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),
2016). The UK Information Commissioner’s Oﬃce
suggests that explicit consent ‘requires a very clear
and speciﬁc statement of consent’ that is ‘expressly
conﬁrmed in words’ (ICO, 2017). However, according
to McDermott (2017), data protection as a fundamen-
tal human right is linked to upholding the principle of
autonomy alongside privacy, transparency and non-
discrimination. This points to an information ecology
in which consent may be the primary, but is by no
means the only mechanism through which processing
of personal data can be lawful.
Secondary data processing in a health context is sub-
ject to the common law duty of conﬁdence, as Grace
and Taylor (2013) suggest, which prevents data being
disclosed for purposes outside the ‘reasonable expect-
ations’ of the data subject. In a complex data environ-
ment, such as in the NHS, deﬁning public expectations
for control of patient-identiﬁable data and information
governance systems is also complex (Caldicott, 1997).
While obtaining consent from the data subject for sec-
ondary use of personal data is the default position
(Grace and Taylor, 2013), the use of de-identiﬁed
data and of identiﬁable data in the public interest
reduces the obligation to obtain consent. As Barocas
and Nissenbaum (2014a, 2014b) note, informed consent
has ‘longstanding operational challenges’ which are
exacerbated in an era of Big Data and complex data
ﬂows. Anonymised data also has signiﬁcant limits in an
inter-connected data world.
One approach to managing the mutable nature of
consent is through ‘opt-outs’ through which data sub-
jects can object to the use of data for secondary pur-
poses. Precisely deﬁning the opt-out in an
understandable way in a form which can be operatio-
nalised is not easy, and if done badly, can result in a
loss of public trust and the fracturing of the social
licence to collect and process data, as exempliﬁed in
the failed care.data scheme (Carter et al., 2015;
Ostherr et al., 2017; Vezyridis and Timmons, 2017).
Sexton et al. (2017), MacNeil (2011), Flinn and
Shepherd (2011), and others have explored the trust
nexus surrounding records and data, suggesting that
public trust is a ﬂuid construct, dependent on an ever-
changing dynamic between data, the space-time in
which it exists, and those that interact with it.
Taylor (2015) argues that the way forward through
the dichotomy of opposing tensions is to ensure that
data protection is framed not just in terms of individual
rights and freedoms but as a collective public good. A
number of authors have examined issues around the
focus of consent on the autonomous individual, the
binary choices presented by consent to privacy notices
as a condition of accepting a service (Cate and Mayer-
Scho¨nberger, 2013), and the increasingly social context
of consent, transformed by digital data (Ruppert et al.,
2013). Social contract theory from the work of moral
and political philosophers, including, in the 20th cen-
tury, John Rawls (1958), might help us to rethink con-
sent in a social context. A social contract theory seeks
to show that citizens ‘comply with the fundamental
social rules, laws, institutions, and/or principles of
that society’, ‘by rational agreement’ even though indi-
vidual reasons for complying diﬀer (Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). Traditionally, the
social contract relied on consent, but contemporary
social contract theory has moved towards agreement
and the question of justiﬁcation (Rawls, 1958). This
aims to model the reasons and conditions under
which citizens would agree, if they were properly
2 Big Data & Society
informed about an issue and acted in a reasonable
manner.
These ideas change the frame of the discussion on
privacy, rights, and data protection away from a focus
on individual data subject rights towards achieving col-
lectively beneﬁcial outcomes. It may be possible to re-
model the role that consent should play in balancing
individual privacy and wider societal beneﬁts through a
social contract model for data sharing.
Research methods: Four instrumental
case studies
This article draws on research undertaken by the
authors as part of the Administrative Data Research
Centre in England (ADRC-E). Between 2014 and
2017, we conducted four case studies on government
administrative data for education, transport, energy,
and health. The purpose of the research was to examine
stakeholder perspectives about the sharing, linking, and
re-use (secondary use) of administrative data. We chose
the four cases as major central government policy areas
which make extensive use of administrative data, that
would provide a suﬃciently extensive range of data
providers and datasets, oﬀered variable levels of
public awareness of secondary use of data (higher in
education and health, than in energy and transport),
and suﬃcient numbers of academic researchers using
administrative data to enable the research. The quali-
tative study undertook 44 semi-structured interviews,
plus one focus group of 4, as the main data collection
method. Interview data was triangulated with docu-
mentary analysis (such as data access protocols, con-
sent forms, etc.) and set into a literature review. The
secondary use of government administrative data by
academic researchers was the central focus through
which the interviews examined data and stakeholder
issues. Gathering perspectives from academic research-
ers (at a variety of career stages), who use government
administrative data in their research, therefore formed
the core of each case study, and their perspective is
most fully reﬂected in the results. However, interviews
with other stakeholders including government bodies
acting as data providers, policy makers, advisors, regu-
latory bodies, research funders, and lobby groups
enriched the data. In the education case study, we
also interviewed ﬁve data subjects. The stakeholders
represented in the research are more fully explored in
Sexton et al. (2017). A summary of the interviewees is
given in Table 1. An example semi-structured interview
protocol which framed the questions for the academic
researchers is included in Table 2. All interviewees were
anonymised, and extracts used in this article are attrib-
uted to individual interviews by use of a code (e.g.
A10). We articulated the study’s research questions
through three themes which framed the data analysis:
trust, risk, and consent. Interview transcripts were the-
matically coded line-by-line, captured in NVivo 10,
assigning a coding label to each component and reﬁn-
ing the codes into themes derived inductively from the
data, in an iterative process of analysis and assigning
meaning. Codes were reviewed, at the level of the coded
data extracts, and later in relation to the entire set of
data, to ensure the themes reﬂected the participants’
unique perspectives grounded in the data. This article
concentrates on our analysis of the role and nature of
consent in government administrative data.
In the education case study, the main dataset used by
researchers was the National Pupil Database (NPD); a
person-level database which matches pupil and school
Table 1. Summary of interviewees in ADRC-E study.
Case study
Number of
interviewees Types of interviewees Coding range
Dates of data
collection
Scoping study 5 Academic researchers A1-A5 June 2014–July 2014
Education data 12, plus 4 in
a focus group
University students (data subjects), HEI
student data manager, academic
researchers, data providers (DfE)
FG1, A6–A17 December 2014–
April 2015
Transport data 9 Academic researchers A22–A25, A28,
A29, A31–A33
September 2015–
November 2015
Energy data 5 Academic researchers, data providers A26, A27, A30,
A34, A35
October 2015–
January 2016
Health data 18 Academic researchers, data providers,
policy advisors, information and data
managers, data subject representatives
A36–A53 May 2016–
October 2016
HEI: Higher Education Institution.
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Table 2. Example interview protocol.
ADRC-E Academic Researcher Interview Protocol
Introduction
The interview questions have been structured according to the five phases of the Data Documentation Initiative’s research data
lifecycle model (DDI lifecycle http://www.ddialliance.org). You will probably have a more detailed knowledge of some phases of the
model than others, and it may help to keep one or two specific examples in mind as we work through the interview.
 Can you give me a brief outline of the type of research that you do, including any relevant recent projects which have made use of
government administrative data?
 Does your research involve purely administrative data, or do you link administrative data to other data sources (e.g. survey data,
longitudinal cohort studies)?
 Does your research use administrative data from a single government source, or from two or more departments? Please give
details.
 Do you use this data with a single research purpose in mind, or do you (intend to) re-use the same dataset to investigate other
research questions?
 Do you know whether the data you use in your research is also used by other researchers and/or for other use purposes? If yes,
please give details.
Discovery and planning
Designing research
 Can you describe your first steps in planning to use government administrative data? Who do you approach initially and what level
of detail do you provide to them about your proposed research? i.e. do you have a defined idea of which variables and/or datasets
might be useful, or do you start out with a more general idea that the data provider might be able to supply datasets of interest?
 If you were advising a researcher in your field who was hoping to use government administrative data for the first time in their
research, what tips would you give them on how to go about applying for access to such data?
 Do you review other researchers’ work using the same or similar data before you approach the data provider for access for your
own work?
 At what point in the research design process do you first get in touch with the prospective data provider? How much lead time
do you need to build into the planning process?
 What ethical approval processes are you required to undergo at your home institution? To what extent does the data access
application procedure for government administrative data duplicate or build upon this standard ethics procedure?
Planning data management
 What kinds of guarantees do you provide to the data provider about how you will manage the data, and access to it, during the
course of your research project?
 Are you under any obligation to (a) your home institution (b) your funder(s) (c) your collaborators’ institutions or any other third
party concerning data management and access? Please give details. Are there any conflicting requirements and how are these
resolved in practice?
Planning consent for sharing
 Do you typically apply for access to government administrative data for yourself alone, or for all the members of your research
group, or for yourself and named collaborators?
 Are any of these collaborators based outside of the European Union?
 What personal details and level of detail about the aims, methods and outputs of your proposed research are you asked/do you
expect to give to the data provider before your application can proceed? Do you know how the data provider processes this
information and what checks are made?
 Do you propose to share access to the data with anyone outside of your research group or institution?
 How long does it typically take from application to being granted approved researcher status?
Planning data collection, process protocols and templates
 Can you provide examples of any application forms or protocols supplied by the data provider(s)?
 Does the data provider give any support in putting together a formal access request?
 Can you provide examples of data access or permission agreements, confidentiality protocols, approved researcher application
forms, etc. that you have in place for current or previous research projects?
 Do you ask, and is it possible, to view samples of the variables and data you are hoping to gain access to, in order to help plan
your research?
Finding and discovering existing data sources
 What documentation is available to you about the data content itself? How much do you typically know about the circumstances
in which the data was originally collected by the data provider? e.g. do you have examples of forms used to collect the data? Are
you aware of any confidentiality promises made to data subjects at the point of collection?
 How do you submit your application for access?
 How clear are (a) the application process (and any guidelines) (b) the approval criteria, to you as a researcher?
(continued)
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Table 2. Continued
ADRC-E Academic Researcher Interview Protocol
 Who is responsible for reviewing the applications and for granting approvals?
 How long does it typically take from submitting your application to approval being granted for release of the data?
Data collection
Collecting data – recording, observation, measurement, experimentation and simulation
 What forms of filtering are performed on the data before it is released to you? Do you think this filtering is reasonable or
excessive? Are you able to request customised preparation of the data?
e.g. pseudonymisation, customised data release, removal of geographic identifiers, etc.
 What kinds of data output are you looking for?
e.g. aggregated datasets, cross tabulations, regression coefficients
Capturing and creating metadata
 Typically, what kinds of supporting information (metadata) are available about the data itself? e.g. codebooks
Acquiring existing third party data
 Is any charge made for access to this government administrative data?
 Are there any other access or redistribution restrictions?
Data processing and analysis
 What physical security features are in place to prevent unauthorised access to government administrative data at the location
where you carry out your data analysis?
e.g. electronic card entry, CCTV, webcams, secure room, etc.
 What technological infrastructure is used to provide access to (and prevent unauthorised access) to the data?
e.g. VPN, Citrix, etc.
 Are you required to validate your identity on each occasion that you wish to use government administrative data, and if so, in
what way(s)?
e.g. usernameþ password, smart card technology, biometrics
 Are you required to undergo any form of training before being granted access to government administrative data? If yes, can you
describe what this training covers and how it is delivered (face-to-face, online, etc.)? Do you think this training is an adequate
preparation for working with government administrative data?
 How far are you able to conform to the terms of the data provider’s licence granting you access to data for research? Are there
any particular stipulations which you have difficulty in meeting? i.e. what is the gap between a strict interpretation of the data
provider’s terms and actual research settings in practice?
Entering data, digitising, transcribing and translating
 What software do you use to analyse the data?
e.g. SPSS, STATA, etc.
Checking, validating, cleaning and anonymising data where necessary
 Do you check or validate the data provided to you in any way before beginning your research analysis?
 Do you perform any further cleaning or anonymisation of the data (beyond any filtering carried out by the data provider)?
 What impact would you say filtering of data (whether performed by the data provider or by the researcher) has upon (a) the
feasibility of different kinds of research question you would like to explore (b) the validity of your research?
Deriving data
 Are you permitted to create new datasets by combining data from one source with another dataset from the same source or
another provider’s dataset(s)? If yes, are there any limitations on the kinds of data linking you are permitted to carry out?
 Would you like to compare government administrative data from England with the same or similar data relating to (a) other
countries within the UK (b) other countries within the EU (c) countries outside of the EU? Is this data use permitted?
Describing and documenting data
 Do you document the process(es) and methods you use to prepare or analyse the data? Can you provide examples?
Analysing data
 What support is available from (a) the data provider (b) your institution in regard to analysing government administrative data?
e.g. running researcher-supplied code
 Would you like any further form of support which is not provided? Please give details.
Interpreting data
 Does the data provider offer any support in understanding, analysing or interpreting their data? If yes, can you describe what form
this takes?
 Do you find you need to go back to the data provider to ask for further information on the data source(s) in the light of the
findings emerging from your research?
Producing research outputs
 What criteria are put in place for disclosure review before publication or other dissemination of research outputs?
(continued)
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Table 2. Continued
ADRC-E Academic Researcher Interview Protocol
 Is any charge made by the data provider for disclosure review?
 Does the data provider insist upon a right of review before publication or dissemination of research outputs? If yes, how is this
done and how long does it take (review of draft analysis, final text, lead-in time allowed, etc.)?
Authoring publications
 Does the data provider seek to be named as a co-author in publications or other public dissemination of the research?
 How does the data provider require their input in providing the data for the research to be acknowledged?
Citing data sources
 How are data providers and data sources acknowledged in publications and other research outputs?
Managing and storing data
 Who is responsible for providing storage for government administrative data during the course of your research (researcher,
researcher’s institution, data provider, third party provider, e.g., UKDA) and is there any charge associated with this storage?
 What security features (physical and/or technological) do you put in place to safeguard access to preliminary and interim results
of your analysis based upon government administrative data?
 Are these locations accessible to anyone other than the approved researchers for each specific project?
Publishing and sharing
Establishing copyright of data
 Does the data provider seek to obtain any rights over the publication or dissemination of research based upon ‘their’ data?
Creating discovery metadata and user documentation
 Do you create any metadata or documentation about the dataset(s) in the course of your research? If yes, do you offer this
information back to the data provider for the benefit of future users?
 Do you have any ethical or licence-based duty to report errors in the dataset back to the data provider?
 Does your research produce machine-readable data? If so, what formats and procedures are used to do this (RDF, etc.)? Is this
data offered back to the data provider or shared more widely?
Publishing or sharing data
 What technological infrastructure is in place to share preliminary research results with the data provider?
e.g. VPN, encryption
 What statistical controls are put in place in research outputs to prevent accidental disclosure? e.g. aggregated results
 Is formal permission or clearance required from the data provider before proceeding to publication? Do you have examples?
 What expectations (obligations or commitments) are there from (a) your home institution (b) funder(s) (c) collaborators’
institutions or other third parties in terms of publication and open access to publicly funded research? Do these requirements
conflict in any way with the data provider’s licence terms? If so, how to do you manage the conflict between the two and how
onerous do you find this responsibility?
Distributing data
 Are you free to distribute your results multiple times without resubmitting a publication clearance application to the data
provider?
Controlling access to data
 Are you aware of any unauthorised disclosures – accidental or deliberate – of government administrative data within your area of
expertise?
 Is the approval procedure a one-off, or is there a mechanism for re-assessing your data access request during the course of your
research project, or as other relevant data comes to light?
 Is the research approval process a one-off, or do you have to re-apply for each new dataset you wish to use?
Promoting data
 In what ways is it possible for peer-reviewers to establish the validity and reliability of your analysis?
Long-term management
Preserving and curating data
 What are your obligations or commitments to (a) your home institution (b) funder(s) (c) collaborators’ institutions and other
third parties as regards the long-term retention of the datasets upon which your research is based?
 Are you aware of any formal data management commitments made in the original proposal for funding? Can you provide copies of
these requirements?
 Do you have access to the technological and administrative infrastructure required for the long-term storage and management of
datasets? Is this (a) an in-house institutional service (b) a service offered by the data provider (c) a third party supplier? Please give
details of any such service you have used in the past or might consider in the future.
Migrating data to best format
 Do you transform the data into other formats in the course of your research? (.csv, .sav, .dta, etc.) Please give details.
(continued)
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characteristic data to pupil attainment. Access requests
are scrutinised by theDepartment for Education (DfE)’s
Data and Education Standards Analysis Group and the
Data Management Advisory Panel (DMAP) (UK DfE,
2016). Researchers can apply for data linked to Higher
Education Statistics, and to Further Education students’
Individual Learning Record.
In the transport case study, many researchers relied
on open data. The STATS19 database of road traﬃc
accidents resulting in personal injury, available from
the Department for Transport (DfT), is collected by
the police, validated by local authorities, and collated
at the DfT. The dataset, published annually, is avail-
able through the UK Data Service, as open data
through data.gov.uk, and directly from the DfT.
The key dataset in the energy case study was the
anonymised dataset of the National Energy Eﬃciency
Data (NEED) Framework, collated by the Department
of Energy and Climate Change (DECC). It brings
together data on gas and electricity consumption pro-
vided by UK utility companies, Home Energy
Eﬃciency Database, property values and household
characteristics from other government agencies, utility
regulators and external data providers (including com-
mercial credit brokers). The data in NEED is ‘publi-
cally available data and data provided through
commercial licences, voluntary agreements and service
level agreements with dataset owners’ (UK Department
for BEIS, 2013).
The main dataset that researchers in the health case
study used was Hospital Episodes Statistics (HES); a
patient-level database containing over a billion records
of patients attending Accident and Emergency units,
admitted for treatment or attending outpatients clinics
at National Health Service (NHS) hospitals in England.
NHS Digital publishes annual HES data from 2009 at
provider-level as open data. Researchers can access
anonymised in context (or more fully identiﬁable),
patient-level data. Access requests go to the Data
Access Request Service of NHS Digital, and through
IGARD (the Independent Group Advising (NHS
Digital) on the Release of Data), replacing the Data
Access Advisory Group since 2017.
Results: Four case studies
This section examines the data from each of the four
case studies in turn, drawing out the ﬁndings around
the role and nature of consent in government adminis-
trative data.
The role of consent in enabling research
use of routinely collected administrative data
for education
In recent years, the DfE has been at the forefront of
government data sharing initiatives, leading in an
‘exemplary way’ (A12) on ensuring that routinely
Table 2. Continued
ADRC-E Academic Researcher Interview Protocol
Migrating data to suitable medium
 Do you have a data management plan to cover hardware/software replacement where you require local access to data over the
term of a multi-year project?
Backing up and storing data
 What happens to the data you have used after publication or when your research project funding ceases?
 What happens to your preliminary or interim analysis results after publication or when your research project funding ceases?
Gathering and producing metadata and documentation
 (If interviewee indicates in-house or third party supplier of long-term preservation infrastructure) What supporting documen-
tation (metadata) about the dataset is handed over for long-term retention and how is this linked to the dataset?
Reusing data
Conducting subsequent analysis
 Do you ever undertake further or subsequent analyses using the same underlying dataset(s)? If yes, please give an example.
Undertaking follow-up research
 How straightforward would it be to undertake follow-up research based upon the same or similar data?
Conducting research reviews
 Are meta-analyses commonly conducted in your field? Would it be possible to include your results in such meta-analytical
studies? What difficulties might a researcher wishing to include your administrative dataset studies in a meta-analysis encounter?
Scrutinising findings
 What level of access would be required in order to attempt to replicate your results?
Using data for teaching and learning
 Do you use government administrative data in your teaching at all? Please provide examples. What difficulties do you/might you
encounter in using such data in your teaching?
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collected government education data can be used
‘extensively by researchers’ (A12). This open attitude
to sharing data for secondary research use has been
part of a cultural shift where a more risk averse attitude
of ‘not giving the data to anyone unless they had to’
(A16) has been superseded by a deeper dedication to
‘widening access’ (A13). As one respondent
commented:
You know, some people think we should just put the
National Pupil Database on the web so anyone who
wants to use it. . . and obviously in a world of open
policy-making and open data, there’s much to be said
for that. (A16)
This attitudinal shift in DfE reﬂects changes to the
regulations governing the sharing of individual pupil
data, where a narrow deﬁnition of acceptable research
was broadened to legitimise use of individual pupil data
for the social and collective ‘purpose of promoting the
education or well-being of children in England’ and
‘conducting research or analysis, producing statistics,
or providing information, advice or guidance’ (UK
Government, 2013). Our interviewees saw this as a
positive impact on moving ‘the research ﬁeld forward’
(A12). The DfE also introduced more transparent, well
publicised and consistent access protocols to its data-
sets, notably the NPD. More researchers are accessing
and making use of education data than has previously
been possible, for a much wider range of research
initiatives.
The DfE’s open attitude to secondary use can be set
against the relatively peripheral role that consent plays
in enabling data collection. In the NPD, school data
collection is mainly mandatory under speciﬁc legisla-
tion and regulation (Education Act 2005 section 114,
Education Act 1996 section 537A, Children Act 1989
section 83, UK Government, 2013), and relies upon the
display of privacy notices in schools and on local
authority websites. A limited opt-out arrangement is
oﬀered (to parents of children aged 13 upwards to
their 16th birthday, and thereafter to the students them-
selves) which restricts the exchange of data with local
youth support services, but there is no equivalent opt-
out mechanism in respect of the same data passed by
schools to local authorities and to the DfE. As
described by A13:
Privacy notice[s] tell parents, teachers and children why
we need to collect the information, what we’re allowed
to use it for, and that covers any request that we will get
that we will then approve, so we don’t have to go
through actual permissions from the schools [or indi-
vidual pupils] themselves. . .so we have the legal side
covered to allow us to release this data.
Secondary research use of pupil data held in the NPD is
legitimised without an individual data subject’s con-
sent. Pupils and their legal guardians seem generally
tolerant of the lack of provision for consent and opt-
out: one parent’s blogpost response to the DfE consult-
ation objecting to the lack of consent provision is
exceptional (inﬁniteideasmachine, 2012).
Governance of requests to re-use education data
held by DfE for research is provided by the DMAP
which includes external representation (UK DfE,
2016). Data in NPD is broken down into four tiers.
Tier One data are directly identifying (includes names,
addresses, date of birth, exam candidate number,
unique learner number) and/or highly sensitive
(includes looked-after status, ethnicity, Special
Educational Needs assessments, reasons for exclusion,
and absence). Requests to use this data always go
through DMAP, as do all requests for linkages with
other datasets. Tiers Two to Four relate to less identi-
ﬁable and sensitive classes of data, which are usually
handled by the NPD and Data Sharing Team.
Governance oversight seeks to ensure that data
requests are in line with legislation and regulations,
whether the data requested is proportionate to need
(data minimisation) and security standards are propor-
tionate. For highly sensitive and identiﬁable data
releases, a ﬁnite period of time for which access is per-
mitted for research is agreed under speciﬁc licensing
agreements. The consent of data subjects, or their
legal guardians, for such secondary re-use is not
required.
However, where researchers seek to link independ-
ently collected cohort data to routinely collected
administrative education data (such as the NPD), the
consent of data subjects is required as the independ-
ently collected data is not covered by the legal gate-
ways. Here, in keeping with a proactive approach to
data sharing, DfE governance is light touch:
If a researcher has collected some data outside that area
and wants to link it to the NPD. . .they have to show us
that they’ve got the relevant consent arrangements in
place. We don’t need to see evidence of that consent
anymore, but the onus is on them. (A13)
Some of our interviewees questioned whether it is eth-
ical to use individuals’ data for research or data linkage
without consent, and whether the privacy notices were
suﬃciently detailed about secondary uses. A8
remarked: ‘I really buy into the idea that people
should be told that if their data’s going to be used for
a secondary purpose that that needs to be made clear to
them at the time that they provide that information’.
A12 argued that asking for individual consent for
research purposes is problematic not only because of
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its likely impact upon research re-use of the data but
also because it is likely to cause problems for existing
government uses of data for monitoring educational
progress. A12 set out the diﬃculties:
If you ever made it optional, the government would
stop functioning because, obviously the administrative
data is not there for research, the administrative data is
there ﬁrst and foremost for them to run the system, so if
you started to have to ask every individual whether or
not they can put their data in this database, um, well,
you couldn’t do that [laughs]!
Students (who were data subjects) had diﬀerent views
on whether it was reasonable to gain consent from
them. One expressed anxiety about a perceived lack
of control over how data was used, even if they did
not object to their data being used for research:
I think my biggest issue is that I don’t know what I
have and haven’t agreed to. . . .I don’t mind sharing it
because I think there’s a use to sharing this, and pool-
ing it together for research and analysis, but it just
worries me that I can’t turn round and say I know
exactly what sort of information is being held about
me, how, and for what reasons. (A20)
While another reﬂected that the system did not allow
for changes over time: ‘. . . as a child at school, you may
have had data collected about you, and then, later in
life, you know, you may encounter certain issues and
want to retract it’ (A18).
In summary, in relation to research use of
routinely collected education data such as NPD, for
the most part, the collection, sharing and linking of
individual-level personal education data for research
use are unconsented. Research use of government
administrative data for education is subject to a legis-
lative and regulatory framework which enables second-
ary use largely without consent, relying instead on a
system of privacy notices. Where consent is deemed
necessary for speciﬁc uses, the DfE takes a ‘light
touch’ approach with researchers responsible for
obtaining consent. Although some of the data collected
is considered sensitive (Tier One), most is not, and the
data is collected in a mandatory context, with a limited
system of opt-outs for data sharing. DfE operates a
clear governance framework which generally facilitates
data release for research use, suggesting a relatively low
level of risk aversity with respect to data release. Public
perception seems surprisingly tolerant of the lack of
explicit consent mechanisms for NPD, when compared,
say, with health data, although students expressed some
concerns about their lack of control over their educa-
tional data.
Transport data and open data
In relation to government administrative transport
data, the role of data subject consent in determining
research re-use of the data is also peripheral, but for
entirely diﬀerent reasons. The Department for
Transport (DfT) has been at the vanguard of eﬀorts
to facilitate better use of, and access to, data for more
eﬃcient government and the public beneﬁt. DfT com-
missioned research into a UK National Transport
Data Framework (NTDF) (Landshoﬀ and Polak,
2008), in advance of the government-wide push
towards open government data and, in the wake of
the Shakespeare Review (2013) which considered the
growing value of public sector information and how it
could be better exploited including recommending the
publication of a National Data Strategy, published an
open data strategy (DfT, 2013). The strategy states
that ‘transport is a ‘data-rich’ area, where there is
huge public appetite for information that can be
used to inform travel choices, to improve performance
and to hold operators and Government to account’,
including ‘datasets owned and published by the wider
industry such as timetables and real-time running’
information. Movement towards open data by DfT
and its agency family (including the Driver and
Vehicle Licencing Agency (DVLA)) resulted in
public availability of large numbers of oﬃcial statis-
tical datasets relating to road and public transport.
DVLA has been a leader in developing digital govern-
ment services, enabling sharing of data with the motor
trade and insurance industries, local government and
the police, as well as launching online access for indi-
viduals to their own driving licence records (https://
www.gov.uk/view-driving-licence). The sale of DVLA
vehicle register data, although speciﬁcally permitted
under statute (UK Government, 2002), has not been
without controversy. DfT’s open data strategy focused
on making data available that is of use to service pro-
viders, application developers, and to individual citi-
zens as data users (DfT, 2013).
Academic researchers interested in transport issues
therefore mainly have to rely on anonymised aggre-
gated open datasets (such as STATS19), rather than
having access to the more granular person-level admin-
istrative data from which these open datasets are
derived. As an aggregated and anonymised dataset,
individual consent from data subjects in STATS19 is
not required for governance. Our interviewees acknowl-
edged that injured individuals’ consent was unlikely to
have been obtained by police attending the scene of an
accident, but this was contrasted by A24 with health
data (potentially relating to the same incident) where
the expectation around obtaining consent was the
opposite.
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Given that much data in the transport arena has
long been open and publicly accessible, it was a
common view that no explicit consent or ethical
review was required for secondary research use, of
STATS19 for example:
Generally speaking when it’s secondary analysis of data
that’s publicly available you do not [gain] ethics
approval, and you know, as long as I think no one is
identiﬁable which they’re not because, you know, it’s
based on collision location, that’s sort of the only vari-
able that could give away anything. (A22)
Some interviewees additionally expressed a view that
research use in the public interest would be a ‘reason-
able expectation’ of individuals submitting data to the
government:
I suppose my slightly hardline view, . . . if people are . . .
giving data to say the government, then I think it’s a
reasonable expectation that that data will be used for,
research or whatever it is for the betterment of the way
things are run. (A28)
And there was a broad agreement amongst several
interviewees on the impracticality or illogicality of
obtaining post hoc consent for data linkage:
I think that if someone was doing some research that
was going to be for the public good that required link-
ing several datasets, I think it’s crazy to say that can’t
go ahead unless you’ve got the approval of all the
people who are in the dataset. I think the consent
side will stiﬂe some good research ideas and will hold
back some research. (A24)
The nature of the transport industry and the wide-
spread re-use and linking of aggregated and anon-
ymised transport data for commercial and traveller
beneﬁt, combined with a general lack of academic
researcher access to personal and identiﬁable data,
result in data subject consent being considered a
minor issue by researchers and data providers. Public
perception seems not to have aﬀected this stance, in
spite of controversy over the sharing of DVLA data
(BBC News, 2012).
Energy data and multiple data sources
A shifting landscape around consent emerges in our
third case study on government administrative data
for energy. DECC collates the NEED framework
which derives from multiple data sources and does
not solely comprise government administrative data.
Instead, multiple data ﬂows of varying provenance
are linked together in-house by DECC, for the pur-
poses of generating government statistics and for inter-
nal research purposes. The statutory basis for DECC’s
acquisition of the data at the heart of the NEED frame-
work – energy consumption data derived from utility
meter readings – lies in the Statistics of Trade Act 1947,
as amended by subsequent legislation, such as the
Electricity Act 1989 and the Utilities Act 2000.
Unsurprisingly, given that the underpinning legislation
is 70 years old, it does not anticipate contemporary
data uses. This legislative framework, coupled with
data licensing restrictions and reinforced by the eﬀects
of privatisation in the utilities sector, severely limits the
extent to which DECC is able to share NEED data
beyond government:
. . . the Statistics of Trade Act, and that allows the gov-
ernment to use, for statistical and research purposes,
information from businesses which is considered to be
useful to the government. . . .we cannot disclose that
information in such a way that any individual business
or any individual entity within the data can be identi-
ﬁed. So we can only publish aggregated ﬁgures and
we can’t pass the data on without the express permis-
sion from the people that have supplied the informa-
tion. (A26)
The restrictions in the legislation mean that identiﬁable
data cannot be disclosed beyond government, and even
the release of aggregated and anonymised data requires
provider level agreement. Despite these legislative
barriers, DECC has made conscientious eﬀorts to
encourage research use of the data by gathering consent
from providers and making an anonymised, partial
dataset available through the UK data service:
So earlier in the year, we wrote to all of the electricity
companies and all of the gas companies, and asked
their permission for us to share their data with aca-
demic research partners that we thought put forward
proposals which were worthwhile. We put lots of cav-
eats around everything to say that we’d ensure that all
the appropriate safeguards were put in place and all the
appropriate protocols were followed to ensure the data
is held securely. But unfortunately, a number of the
suppliers declined, and said they weren’t happy for
that to happen. (A26)
Academic researchers are forced to bypass DECC and
seek access to the individual elements of the complex
data ﬂows which make up NEED (see for example
Critchley et al., 2007; Foulds and Powell, 2014). An
alternative mechanism is for DECC to commission
external researchers in order to provide privileged
access to speciﬁc academics. Even then, DECC will
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‘still have written to the companies to tell them that
that’s happening, we give them the opportunity to
object, it’s kind of like an opt-out.’ (A26)
In place of consent by individual householders,
NEED relies on a privacy impact assessment (PIA) in
conjunction with the energy suppliers and the regulator
to address transparency concerns. It requires that ‘all
suppliers have a privacy policy which provides infor-
mation on how customers’ data is handled’, including a
fair processing notice on how data may be shared with
government. The PIA allows government to link data
‘in circumstances where permission has been granted by
the individual (e.g. through a survey response) or an
appropriate privacy notice has been published’, but
does not enable access by external academics or other
third parties: ‘. . .if we wanted to link the data in-house,
that’s ﬁne . . .. But in order for an academic to link to
this data, we’d have to give them that data, and that’s
the bit we can’t do’ (A26).
However, the centrality of the utility companies in
consenting and approving data access and re-use is set
to change. The presumption that the utility companies
own the data and therefore are in a position to dictate
its ﬂow is being challenged by government policy
around the introduction of ‘smart meters’. While the
utility company owns the meter:
Ownership over the data that you use in your business
and your home is becoming more personalised and it
has been decided under government processes that you,
the homeowners or the person who controls the meter
will own that data, and that the suppliers will not own
that data at all. And you will be the one that grants
access to it. (A27)
The national roll out of smart meters has therefore
brought with it a signiﬁcant change where research
use of energy data will require customer (data subject)
consent: ‘smart meter[s] . . .have put the energy con-
sumer, householder in control of the data. So any use
of the data for research purposes must gain speciﬁc
consent’ (A30).
In the energy data case study, the legislative and
regulatory framework surrounding NEED has sub-
sumed the role of consent to a minor position. The
complexity of the relational context in which utility
data is collected and of the information governance
frameworks is increased by the mix of public, private,
and third parties who deliver energy services. If consent
is required for secondary research, it has to be given by
the data owners, currently often a commercial utility
company: however, in future, the use of smart meters
to collect household data will transfer data ownership
to individuals and that will have signiﬁcant implications
for the need to gain consent for secondary research use
of energy data. No doubt, a programme of public infor-
mation about consent and any opt-outs around energy
data and the public interest in research will have to be
developed.
Personal sensitive health data and the role
of consent
Across our four case studies, the role of consent as a
mechanism for enabling secondary uses of data is argu-
ably most complex in the context of government
administrative health data. In addition to the broad
legal framework, disclosures that have a ‘robust
public interest’ and therefore permissible without expli-
cit consent led to the introduction of Health Service
(Control of Patient Information) Regulations in 2002
(commonly referred to as ‘Section 251’). An independ-
ent group, the Conﬁdentiality Advisory Group (CAG),
advises the Health Research Authority (HRA) and the
Secretary of State for Health on whether to permit pro-
cessing for both research and non-research purposes
without consent under the Section 251 regulations.
Two signiﬁcant safeguards are whether the research is
in the ‘public interest’ and the lack of a ‘practicable
alternative’.
Analysis of our interview data indicates that the
existence of the Section 251 provision is broadly wel-
comed by the range of stakeholders we interviewed
(including health researchers, policy makers and data
providers) as a means of providing a mechanism to
judge when secondary use of identiﬁable and sensitive
health data without consent is legally permissible. The
complexity of the interface between diﬀerent aspects of
the legislative framework can lead to confusion
amongst the research community over when an appli-
cation to CAG may be necessary. However, there was a
strongly articulated perspective from a small minority
of interviewees that questioned the legitimacy of having
a legal override to consent:
The 251 process colloquially is bust, it’s indefensible,
it’s a sham, because in theory you should only have a
251 exemption if you cannot contact the patient to get
their permission. So in what case in the modern world is
it not possible to contact the patient to get their per-
mission? (A36)
Grace and Taylor (2013) argue that under the exercise
of powers through the Health & Social Care Act 2012,
NHS Digital is eﬀectively released from a duty to pro-
vide information about its processing in regard to man-
dated disclosures, and even the more limited right given
to data subjects to object to processing under GDPR is
eﬀectively curtailed. Despite the lack of a legal require-
ment to provide mechanisms to uphold patient
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objections to mandated disclosures, mechanisms have
emerged for doing so in the form of an ‘opt-out’ model
(Taylor and Taylor, 2014). A Type 1 opt-out prevents
identiﬁable information being shared outside of the
individual’s GP practice for purposes beyond direct
care. A Type 2 opt-out prevents NHS Digital from
sharing ‘personal conﬁdential’ information outside of
NHS Digital for purposes beyond direct care. It was
strongly argued across our interviewees that the word-
ing of the opt-outs lacks clarity, making it diﬃcult for
the public to know exactly what they are opting out of,
and consequently also for NHS Digital to know how to
apply the opt-outs. NHS Digital faced complex tech-
nical barriers which prevented it from extracting the
opt-out data from GP data, resulting in a period of
suspension in 2015–2016, during which the opt-out
was put on hold and conﬁdential patient data was
shared against patient wishes (HSCIC, 2015, 2016).
Considerable confusion was voiced by our interviewees
as to the circumstances in which the opt-outs apply to
dissemination of data to researchers.
Most research uses of HES data are not aﬀected by
the opt-out because person-level data is supplied to
researchers pseudonymised (anonymised in context).
However, where researchers want to link data, for
example, between HES and Oﬃce of National
Statistics mortality data, the data given to the
researcher becomes re-identiﬁable. The question of
whether such research requests are subject to the opt-
out has been cause for concern. A39 reported research
into child mortality which was aﬀected by Type 2 opt-
out, but queried the lack of transparency about the
permission pathways, and who is making the decisions
on the application of opt-outs, and whether those deci-
sions can be challenged.
A39 goes on to describe the impact that applying the
opt-out is likely to have on the validity of the research:
If applied it will mean that 2% of the population will be
opted out, if it is in Manchester it will be up to about
6% and at some GP practices it will be 100% so that is
a very important loss of a non-random section of the
population that you really need to know about. . .the
opt-out has the potential to undermine the use of an
important piece of health information, and ultimately
damage research in the public interest.
When a researcher seeks access to identiﬁable and sen-
sitive data (or linking a dataset held by NHS Digital to
identiﬁable and sensitive cohort data), IGARD requires
that either Section 251 supports the proposal to provide
a legal gateway for access without consent, or that the
researcher has gained the informed consent of every
data subject. Whereas the DfE’s DMAP takes a light
touch in relation to its role in checking informed
consents are in place by placing the onus on the
researcher, IGARD takes a far more proactive role.
Wordings of informed consent forms have been scruti-
nised by the panel and, in recent cases, rejected on the
grounds that insuﬃcient explanation has been given to
the data subject to constitute ‘informed’ consent. A24
gave an example of extensive discussion over several
years, requirements to change information sheets mid-
trial in hundreds of hospitals, leading him to conclude,
‘I think they are so cautious or so risk averse they’re not
sure what the requirements are.’
Dame Fiona Caldicott conducted a review (2016) of
the basis upon which information is shared in health and
social care. The review proposed ‘a new consent/opt-out
model to allow people to opt-out of their personal con-
ﬁdential data being used for purposes beyond their
direct care’, although ‘where there is a mandatory legal
requirement for data in place, opt-outs would not
apply’. Even if patients elected to opt-out of data sharing
for research and service improvements, they could
reverse that decision later and could give speciﬁc consent
to be included in a research project. At the time of writ-
ing, these recommendations have not been implemented.
In summary, in relation to health data, consent (and
related opt-outs) plays a far more centralised role in
governing research access to data than is the case for
use of other types of government administrative data.
NHS is generally reluctant to release data for secondary
purposes except through highly scrutinised and regu-
lated information governance processes, in spite of
open data priorities at a national level. The speciﬁcities
of the legislative gateways for health and social care
data are complex, and the consent and opt-out arrange-
ments are diﬃcult to understand or explain clearly to
data subjects. The types of data created are typically
highly sensitive personal data collected in a conﬁdential
setting, often face-to-face with a health professional,
which brings high expectations of trusted data systems
and which GDPR recognises as requiring stricter pro-
cessing. Poor public perception of data management
within the NHS, following high-proﬁle data breaches,
ransomware attacks, and, in particular, the failed data
sharing project, care.data, contributes to a risk averse
stance towards releasing data for secondary research.
Results: Six factors
Our analysis of the four case studies suggested that the
role that consent plays in both enabling and restricting
research use of routinely collected government admin-
istrative data varies between case study sectors and
creating organisations. The factors governing the role
of consent in research use of administrative data which
emerged from the inductive analysis of our interview
data cluster around six issues. The six factors observed
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in our data are not evenly distributed across the case
studies.
The ﬁrst factor relates to the speciﬁcities of the legis-
lative framework governing the collection and process-
ing of the data. The UK Data Protection Act 1998
(succeeded by GDPR in 2018) and the Human Rights
Act 1998 uphold the rights of data subjects in the pro-
cessing of personal data. Within each case study, these
overlap with speciﬁc legislation, for example, relating to
statutory powers of government to mandate data col-
lection, producing a unique context in which consent is
framed. For example, the Statistics of Trade Act 1947
governs data collection by DECC and requires consent
for further dissemination, but the focus of that consent
is on the utility company as the supplier of the data
rather than the individual data subject.
Within the legislative framework, the type of data
being collected and the relational context in which it is
created has an impact on the role that consent plays in
governing research access. Health data is created as part
of a conﬁdential relationship between data subject and
health professional which brings the common law duty
of conﬁdence into the framework and reinforces consent
as a mechanism for secondary data use. Health data was
also classed as sensitive under the Data Protection Act
1998 and as a special category in the GDPR and Data
Protection Act 2018, including a requirement for ‘expli-
cit consent’ to be gained before its secondary use.
Consents gained by researchers working with health
data are scrutinised more closely by NHS Digital, than
those obtained for educational data held by DfE.
Thirdly, the broader information governance frame-
work in which the data resides also has an impact on
consent. A ‘consent by default’ approach has emerged
as the accepted path to data sharing in the NHS. This is
reinforced through the NHS Constitution for England
(2015) which, in relation to ‘consent, respect and con-
ﬁdentiality’ states, ‘you have the right to be informed
about how your information is used’ and ‘to request
that your conﬁdential data is not used beyond your
own care and treatment. . ., and where your wishes
cannot be followed to be told the reasons including
the legal basis’. Health care data subjects are oﬀered
the right to object to further dissemination through
‘opt-outs’. Information and data governance frame-
works are more fully developed in the NHS than in
other parts of the public sector in our study.
The creating organization’s approach to data release
is the fourth factor inﬂuencing consent as a governance
mechanism for research access. The DfT, for example,
has focused its eﬀorts on publishing open data and
deﬂected attention away from the provision of research
access to more granular, person-level, data. Consent as
a governance mechanism is not needed, but at the cost
of having less useful data available for research.
The relative levels of risk aversity within the creating
organization is the ﬁfth factor. In the context of health,
NHS Digital takes considerable measures to scrutinise
the ‘informed consent’ gained by researchers to enable
secondary use of identiﬁable and sensitive data. The
risk aversity seems to be related to the public scrutiny
applied to NHS Digital to account for its data dissem-
ination practices and improve its levels of oversight and
audit. For example, the Partridge Review (2014) con-
sidered data releases made by one of its predecessor
organisations and recommended that NHS Digital
should tighten mechanisms for compliance and
accountability in an attempt to entirely eliminate per-
sonal data breaches.
Finally, public perception plays a part in determining
organizational levels of risk aversity, which in turn has
an eﬀect on approaches to consent. In the case of
health, prominent criticism of data sharing pro-
grammes from the media and lobby groups (such as
the failed attempt to share health data across hospitals
and doctor’s practices, care.data, see Carter et al., 2015)
led to the introduction of opt-outs for mandated data
collections. However, studies by Ipsos MORI (2014,
2016) on the relationship between public understanding
and public trust in the uses of data, and by Health e-
Research Centre (2016) asking to what extent patients
should control access to data, indicated more positive
attitudes emerged, as ‘greater knowledge about the sub-
ject and exposure to the ideas tends to be related to
acceptance’ (Ipsos MORI, 2016). This suggests the pos-
sibility of shifting public perceptions and consequently
of data provider attitudes to risk.
Conclusion
This study evidences the variations in practice across
government in relation to consent for the secondary
research use of administrative data, articulated
around six factors. In unpacking these variations,
there is a fundamental and unanswered question,
which is whether consent is in fact the best mechanism
for enabling individual privacy and public protection
against harm. Manson and O’Neill (2007) argue in
the context of biomedical ethics that consent has
become an accepted orthodoxy. Consent mechanisms
are the primary means of ensuring the individual’s
right to choose (Laurie and Postan, 2013). When indi-
vidualistic self-determination is the goal of data govern-
ance frameworks, the individual gains highly speciﬁed
degrees of choice over how ‘their’ data is used. This is
echoed in our study:
. . .risk is highly contextual, and actually individuals are
reasonably good at understanding the beneﬁts and
rewards of diﬀerent things. We make trade oﬀ decisions
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all the time, and we do so really remarkably well on the
whole, but the professional attitude is that you aren’t in
a position to calculate those risks . . .I am much more
trusting of the public in their abilities to make deci-
sions. (A36)
Autonomy through highly speciﬁc control by the data
subject enables dynamic consent in settings such as bio-
banks (Budin-Ljøsne et al., 2017; Kaye et al., 2015). In
an energy context, the introduction of smart meters
gives a greater degree of control over data sharing to
the homeowner. However, a highly individualised
approach to data sharing, based on the granular con-
sent of the data subject, is not the only model for gov-
ernment administrative data re-use for research.
The majority of researchers we interviewed placed
individual consent as one among many governance
mechanisms within a social contract model of data
sharing. In this framing, the end goal is protection of
data subjects from deception and harm. Interviewees
who championed a social contract model of data shar-
ing framed personal data, not through the language of
individual ownership, but of co-production:
People have an image of medical data and conﬁdenti-
ality that is often captured by the language of owner-
ship. I have it, I give it to the GP to use, and if they
don’t use it in the way I expect then that is an abuse.
But actually I don’t have it, the data is part of the
relationship, all this data is co-produced. . . We need
to understand what the ground rules are of that co-
production process, and we need to work out what is
a betrayal of those ground rules and what isn’t, and
that requires a lot more transparency and openness
but it doesn’t necessarily require a high degree of indi-
vidual privacy choices. (A42)
In archival science, Iacovino (2010) and others have con-
sidered a participant relationship model which ‘acknow-
ledges all parties to a transaction as immediate parties
with negotiated rights and responsibilities’. Such a social
model of co-production of data re-conceptualises the
data subject as a data co-creator and acknowledges
both individual and institutional (indeed, multiple stake-
holder) rights in the data.
As phrased by A42, rather than focusing on consent,
‘it would be much better to think about permissions
and licences and people’s agreement to trust certain
gateway organisations’. In this model:
We need to build up an account of what makes it
acceptable to use this information through a combin-
ation of things, which is not just about ‘we want to do
this, do you agree?’ but it is more about ‘we are not sure
what we might like to do with it, we would like you to
be part of the enterprise, this is what we are building in
as safeguards and protections’. . . .We should be think-
ing about a ‘no surprises’ rule, in that, even if people
haven’t set out expecting this, if we have reason to
believe that they would be surprised and upset then
we need to put some eﬀort into being open and trans-
parent about it. But I don’t think it is helpful to think
about that as a question of consent, it is more a ques-
tion of governance and acceptance. . . .We need . . . a
social contract that allows us to say that we feel we
have permission to do these things. . . we have to put
in place an open and transparent explanation of what
we think we are doing, some processes to reassure that
we are doing what we thought and said we are doing,
and some mechanisms for accountability. (A42)
Governance mechanisms for data sharing must ultim-
ately work to achieve a balance between the mutually
reinforcing public goods of protecting privacy and
enabling use that is in the public interest. Yet, a grow-
ing body of academics, in the context of Big Data, are
questioning whether consent as a governance mechan-
ism can enable this balancing act (Barocas and
Nissenbaum, 2014a, 2014b; Cate and Mayer-
Scho¨nberger, 2013; Kuner et al., 2012; Rubinstein,
2013). Even in isolating the issue of privacy, the poten-
tial in Big Data challenges an individual-orientated
governance approach. Barocas and Nissenbaum
explain this through an exploration of the ‘tyranny of
the minority’ (2014a), where consented disclosure of
information by a few can reveal information about
the many. Barocas and Nissenbaum explore consent
within its social landscape and argue that in both aca-
demic and regulatory circles, attention has focused on
seeking to improve procedures and mechanisms for
capturing informed consent (2014a). Drawing on
Manson and O’Neill (2007), Barocas and Nissenbaum
(2014a) argue instead for a greater focus on mechan-
isms that propagate the social acceptability of data re-
use through a shared articulation of the underpinning
rights, obligations, and legitimate expectations sur-
rounding re-using data.
In practical terms, what might a model based on a
shared articulation of this kind look like? The Nuﬃeld
Council on Bioethics (2015) proposed a social contract
model of data sharing. A social contract model would
need to be underpinned by an agreed set of reasonable
expectations about how data will be shared; clarity and
transparency about the process by which individual
freedoms are respected; agreement on the governance
that will give acceptable assurances, and on who is
accountable for what.
The ethical issues concern the privacy of individuals
and the risk of disclosure, but also the larger moral
consequences and social impact. The balance of risks
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must ensure that data is used responsibly to promote
the public interest, in a way that best reconciles the
interests of individuals and groups, in keeping with
their fundamental rights (Nuﬃeld Council on
Bioethics, 2015). Consent is designed to convince data
subjects and public stakeholders of a pre-determined
public good in research. In contrast, co-constructed
participation in a deliberative and dynamic process bal-
ances the relationship between public and private inter-
ests: this might move the debate towards Rawls’s (1958)
question of justiﬁcation. A social contract model ‘rec-
ognises the necessarily provisional nature of decisions
about data management and governance, since the
horizon of possibilities – and the values and interests
invested in them – are constantly changing as the social,
political, technological and information environments
evolve’ (Nuﬃeld Council on Bioethics, 2015).
In conclusion, then, our study suggests that there is
no single agreed formula for the use of consent as a
suﬃcient mechanism to ensure privacy in the secondary
use of government administrative data. In seeking to
identify applicable norms, mere compliance with the
law and adoption of one-time consent processes is inad-
equate to ensure that data use is ethical and morally
reasonable. Information governance frameworks must
go beyond the law, based on an identiﬁcation of rea-
sonable expectations of privacy and data use held by all
interested parties, to determine the social thresholds for
what is acceptable in a given use context. Consideration
of the six factors identiﬁed in this research could lead to
the development of a more reﬂexive and dynamic pro-
cess of articulating the justiﬁcation for data sharing and
re-use, moving towards a social contract model of
agreement which would provide a more trusted and
transparent approach to sharing of government admin-
istrative data. This would go some way towards
addressing the limitations which our research, and the
work of others, has highlighted of the use of consent as
the primary governance mechanism. Our research sug-
gests that consent is no longer the best or only mech-
anism for data re-use and suggests that a dynamic
social contract model might provide a better approach.
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